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Abstract 
The lack of effective IT governance is widely recognized as a key inhibitor to successful 
global IT outsourcing relationships. In this study we present the development and 
application of a governance framework to improve outsourcing relationships. The 
approach used to developing an IT governance framework includes a meta model and a 
customization process to fit the framework to the target organization. The IT governance 
framework consists of four different elements (1) organisational structures, (2) joint 
processes between in- and outsourcer, (3) responsibilities that link roles to processes and 
(4) a diverse set of control indicators to measure the success of the relationship. The IT 
governance framework is put in practice in Shell GFIT BAM, a part of Shell that 
concluded to have a lack of management control over at least one of their outsourcing 
relationships. In a workshop the governance framework was used to perform a gap 
analysis between the current and desired governance. Several gaps were identified in the 
way roles and responsibilities are assigned and joint processes are set-up. Moreover, this 
workshop also showed the usefulness and usability of the IT governance framework in 
structuring, providing input and managing stakeholders in the discussions around IT 
governance.  
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1 Introduction 
Gartner (2005) observed that organisations generally do not have the proper governance 
in place, especially when the organisation is involved in outsourcing. “Through 2008, 
poor sourcing decisions will diminish the achievable value of services in 80 percent of 
service deals (0.7 probability)”. As a result, organizations involved in outsourcing face 
lost opportunities, higher costs and many risks.  
Shell Global Functions IT Business Application Management (BAM) is no exception. 
This part of Shell concluded recently that management control over at least one of their 
outsourcing relationships needed to be improved and required comprehensive governance 
of the outsourcing relationship. In this study we report on the effort by Shell BAM to 
assess and improve current outsourcing governance practices.  
To better understand the need for outsourcing governance we start by reviewing 
outsourcing risks. These risks can occur during the contracting phase and after an 
outsourcing relationship is set up. We focus on the latter, as many organisations, 
including BAM, face the largest challenges after contracts have been signed. Furthermore 
we focus on a body shop relation, in contrast with for example a Managed Service 
relationship. In a body shop relation the outsourcer hires a specific amount of FTEs from 
an insourcer, while in a Managed Service relation they outsource a complete set of 
services and the amount of FTEs is not relevant. Beulen et al. (2006) provides a 
comprehensive overview of outsourcing risks categories (see Table 1). 
 
Table 1 - Partnership management risk categories (Beulen et al. 2006) 
Risk category Aspects requiring attention 
Cost control IT service delivery costs must be controlled. 
Management 
control 
The service recipient must clearly define the role of the service 
provider and manage the details and specifics of their service 
delivery. 
Demand 
management 
Service recipients need service delivery interfaces, both for their 
company‟s divisions and the provider. 
Priority The service provider must assign sufficient priority to the recipient‟s 
needs. 
Confidentiality No confidential information may be divulged to outsiders or 
unauthorized persons. 
Information 
requirements 
definition 
Service recipients must be able to define which IT services their 
providers must supply. 
Business 
knowledge 
Service providers must have sufficient knowledge of their client‟s 
business to ensure continuity in the delivery of the services needed. 
Business 
dynamics 
Service providers and the contracts made with them must never 
hinder the recipient adapting the delivery requirements as a 
consequence of business management changes. 
Innovation Service providers must regularly introduce new technologies in order 
to make possible and stimulate the recipient‟s innovation processes. 
Vendor lock-
in 
Service recipient must always be able to change providers, and must 
not become dependent on any one supplier. 
 
Furthermore, Beulen mentions five possible disadvantages of outsourcing that directly 
link to these risks. These disadvantages are (1) the increased dependence on suppliers, 
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which is related to the risk category „vendor lock-in‟ mentioned above, (2) a loss of 
knowledge and know-how, which is linked to „business knowledge‟, (3) higher costs that 
is linked to „cost control‟, (4) confidentiality risks that have clear overlap with 
„confidentiality‟ and finally (5) difficulty in selecting the right service provider, which is 
a contracting risk instead of a managing risk. 
Cross-checking this framework with risks that other authors define learn that Beulen‟s 
framework covers all risks. According to Yang “the most prominent risks in outsourcing 
are information security concerns and loss of management control” (Yang et al. 2007), 
which belong to respectively the second and the fifth category Beulen mentions. King 
states that firms have higher risks in general when they have a higher dependence on the 
offshore vendor, which lands in the category „vendor lock-in‟ (King et al. 2008). 
Also Aron (2005) mentions that vendor lock-in is likely to happen, because “as 
outsourcing contracts mature, the power in relationships shifts from the buyers to the 
sellers”, which means that “they cannot bring those processes back into the organization 
on short notice”. This is what Aron calls a structural risk, because it appears on the long 
term. Another structural risk is that “rivals may steal their intellectual property and 
proprietary processes if they transfer processes offshore, especially to emerging 
markets”, part of Beulen‟s risk category „confidentiality‟. As opposed to structural risks 
Aron identifies operational risks that are more critical in the initial stages of offshoring 
and outsourcing. One of the reasons for operational risks is the lack of effective, 
complete metrics because then the outsourcer has no idea of how the insourcer executed 
the work compared to how they did it themselves. This risk belongs to the category 
„management control‟. The second reason for operational risks is that knowledge and 
tasks are not codified or codifiable. This means that “service providers won‟t be able to 
execute business processes as well as their employees perform them in-house” and that 
there has to be room for a learning curve of the insourcer‟s employees. This falls under 
Beulen‟s category „business knowledge‟. Structural risks are caused by the extent to 
which you can measure the process quality (as with operational risks) and the ability to 
monitor work (Aron et al. 2005). 
Research by Lacity confirms this. She states that “in the offshore outsourcing market, 
knowledge transfer has been one of the biggest impediments to success”, which falls in 
the category „business knowledge‟. Furthermore, she also mentions high turnover as a 
risk, whereby interesting work is the key to prevent it (Lacity et al. 2008). Also Mirani 
(2007) recognises the problem of turnover, stating that rival vendors recruit staff away 
with 15-20% higher salaries, causing staff attrition rates to be as high as 45% (Mirani 
2007). 
Shell BAM‟s assessment of one of their outsourcing relationships revealed that some of 
the outsourcing risks were clearly present. There was a need to improve outsourcing 
governance to be able to prevent these risks to decrease the benefits of outsourcing and to 
mitigate these risks whenever they would occur. The research project we report on in this 
paper aims at identifying a framework that could guide Shell BAM in improving the 
governance of the service provision relationship with the insourcer.  
Many authors stress the importance of good IT governance in outsourcing relationships. 
According to King “the offshoring of information systems and services has been one of 
the most discussed phenomena in IS [(Information Systems)] in recent years; it has 
significantly influenced the thinking of both academics and practitioners” (King et al. 
2008). First, day-to-day outsourcing relations will be improved because an insourcer‟s 
activities can be closely monitored and coordinated (Gopal et al. 2003). Secondly, good 
governance will improve the chance on success of (offshore) outsourcing; several authors 
report that the fate of offshoring strategies is decided by the governance choices (Aron et 
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al. 2005; Kern et al. 2001). Thirdly and finally, it has been argued that good outsourcing 
governance will help organisations to prevent poor management of interfirm 
relationships, which result in lower market value on the long term (Holcomb et al. 2007). 
While much has been published on outsourcing benefits, contracting and risks, the topic 
of governing the outsourcing relationship has received less attention. As will be shown in 
section 3, governance literature mainly provides generic management frameworks and 
high-level best practices. In the Shell BAM project it became apparent that the current 
body of knowledge on governance of IT outsourcing did not provide enough guidance to 
design and implement governance structures. Shell BAM expressed the need for a 
generic but customizable framework that could be easily applied to improve the 
governance of the service provision relationship with the insourcer. Such a framework 
should help in setting up governance especially in areas were risks are likely to occur or 
would have a large impact. As no such method or framework could be found, it was 
decided to develop such a framework in this research.  
The following research question was devised: How can a generic but customizable 
framework be developed to aid an organisation in improving the governance of the 
service provision relationship with the insourcer? 
The remainder of this paper describes the research approach (section 2), research on IT 
governance (section 3), the development of the framework (section 3 and 4) and the 
application of the framework to Shell BAM (Section 5).The final section presents 
conclusion and future research.  
2 Research Approach 
We follow a design science research approach as described by Hevner et al. (2004). 
Design research aims to achieve both rigor and relevance. “Design Science creates and 
evaluates IT artifacts intended to solve identified organizational problems” (Hevner et al. 
2004). The artefact created in this research is the IT governance framework. Following 
the design science tradition, the requirements for the artifact are set by business needs, 
which are elicited by interviewing experts both inside and outside Shell. Also according 
to design science principles, we apply theories from the IT governance and outsourcing 
knowledge base to design the artefact. The artefact is assessed by applying it to the Shell 
BAM situation and by running a workshop with stakeholders to test its usability and 
understandability. Finally, as suggested by the design science approach, steps to 
implement the framework in BAM are suggested and contributions to the current 
literature are presented. Table 2 describes how the research approach adheres to the 
design guidelines expressed by Hevner et al (2004). 
 
Table 2 – how the research approach follows design science guidelines 
Design Science 
Guideline 
How the guideline is applied in this research 
Design as an 
Artifact 
A customizable IT governance framework is created 
Problem 
Relevance 
The main problem of this research is both important and relevant to 
Shell GFIT BAM and comparable businesses that aim to improve 
their outsourcing governance. Experts internal to Shell and external 
experts on outsourcing were interviewed 
Design 
Evaluation 
In this research we performed a workshop with various stakeholders 
in Shell GFIT BAM to use and evaluate the IT governance 
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framework 
Research 
Contributions 
The main contribution of the research is the Design Artefact itself, being the 
IT governance model. A customizable governance framework that is tested 
in and documented is currently lacking in literature 
Design as a 
Search Process 
Because researches have a certain scope and assumptions about the 
problem space, existing artifacts may not directly solve a problem in 
practice. The practical requirements guided us towards striving for a 
customizable framework. 
Multiple stakeholders with varying backgrounds may have different 
requirements. Therefore the assessment using a workshop helps in 
guiding the search process. Ideally, the artifact needs continuous 
development through similar workshops in Shell and other 
organizations  
Communication 
of Research 
The framework is described using visual and textual representations. 
In addition RASC charts are used to describe roles for certain 
process areas. To serve both Technology-oriented audiences and 
Management-oriented audiences formal and complex process 
notations are avoided. The goal was to find a balance between 
understandability and expressive power of the framework 
 
Figure 1 shows the steps in the research approach sequentially over time. The arrows 
show the outcomes needed in order to reach the goal, according to the technique as 
described by Verschuren and Doorewaard (1999). 
 
(a) (d)(c)(b)
Used IT
governance
framework
Literature
research on IT
oursourcing in
general
Structured
interviews with
market experts
Structured
interviews with
Shell experts
Literature
research on IT
outsourcing
relationships
IT governance
meta model
Workshop on
current situation
at Shell GFIT
BAM
IT governance
framework
 
Figure 1 - Research approach 
 
Figure 1 shows that (a) a literature exploration about IT outsourcing will enable us to 
define our IT governance meta model. (b) The combination of this meta model with 
information from theory, the market and within Shell will enable us to define a generic IT 
governance framework. (c) Application of this framework on the current situation of 
Shell will test and demonstrate that (d) the framework is useful for workshops, being both 
generic and customizable. 
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3 Developing an IT Governance Metamodel 
This research focuses on IT Governance of the relationship between the insourcer and 
Shell GFIT BAM. IT governance has been defined in different ways. Beulen (2006) gives 
an overview of the most important IT governance definitions (Table 3). 
 
Table 3 - Definitions of IT governance (Beulen et al. 2006) 
Researchers IT governance definition 
(Brown et al. 
1994) 
IT governance describes the locus of responsibility for IT functions. 
(Luftman 1996) IT governance is the degree to which the authority for making IT 
decisions is defined and shared among management, and the 
processes managers in both IT and business organizations apply in 
setting IT priorities and the allocation of IT resources. 
(Sambamurthy et 
al. 1999) 
IT governance refers to the patterns of authority for key IT activities. 
(van Grembergen 
2002) 
IT governance is the organizational capacity by the board, executive 
management and IT management to control the formulation and 
implementation of IT strategy and in this way ensure the fusion of 
business and IT. 
(Weill et al. 
2002) 
IT governance describes a firm‟s overall process for sharing decision 
rights about IT and monitoring the performance of IT investments. 
(Schwartz et al. 
2003) 
IT governance consists of IT-related structures or architectures (and 
associated authority patterns), implemented to successfully 
accomplish (IT-imperative) activities in response to an enterprise‟s 
environment and strategic imperatives. 
(IT Governance 
Institute 2004) 
IT governance is the responsibility of board directors and executive 
management. It is an integral part of enterprise governance and 
consists of the leadership and organizational structures and processes 
that ensure that the organization‟s IT sustains and extends the 
organization‟s strategies and objectives. 
(Weill et al. 
2004) 
IT governance is specifying the decision rights and accountability 
framework to encourage desirable behaviour in using IT. 
 
(Brown et al. 1994) discuss mainly the locus (place) of IT decision-making. (Luftman 
1996; Sambamurthy et al. 1999) focus on the decision-making processes. Weill (2002) 
added return on investment, and in the same period van Grembergen (2002) stated that 
organisations should as well ensure the organisational capacity to formulate the IT 
strategy. In 2003 Schwartz added the observations that the environment influences the 
right IT governance structure, and so do the perceptions that the IT organisation and the 
rest of the company have of one another. Finally, Weill recognized the importance of 
accountability in 2004 (Beulen et al. 2006). 
However, the definition that matches best with our aim is the definition of the IT 
Governance Institute (2004). Several other authors use this definition (e.g. (Gewald et al. 
2006; van Grembergen et al. 2005)) and the advantage in the context of this research is 
that the distinction between organisational structures and processes is concrete enough to 
relate to the business (Brown et al. 1994). 
Based on the definition of a governance model as described below by Gewald (2006) and 
our definition of IT governance as described above, we define a governance framework 
for managing an offshore outsourcing relationship as follows: 
 7 
A governance framework of an offshore outsourcing relationship is a structure that 
describes the joint processes and organisational structures, whereby also control 
indicators and responsibilities are defined. 
A governance framework should address the questions “what to do”, “how to do it”, 
“who should do it” and “how it should be measured”” (Gewald et al. 2006). The joint 
process fields describe the “what to do”, “how to do it” is described by the combination 
of those processes with the organisational structures into roles and responsibilities, the 
organisational structures define “who should do it”. How it should be measured” is the 
topic of the control indicators (CIs). 
As described before, we are looking for a generic and customizable „IT governance 
framework‟. We therefore start by presenting a Meta-Governance model. This model is 
defined at a higher level (the meta level) and can be instantiated based on the 
organizational requirements to create a governance framework for a specific outsourcing 
relationship. The meta governance framework is depicted in  
Figure 2: 
 
Meta Governance model
Outsourcer
Role
Insourcer
Organisational
structures
Joint process fields
Field B
Field D
Field C
Field A
Role
Role
Role
Role
Role
Role
 
 
Figure 2 - Meta Governance Model 
 
The meta governance model in  
Figure 2 can be specified on three hierarchical levels of an organisation; the strategic, 
tactical and operational level. This paper focuses on the tactical level. The tactical level 
defines the framework wherein the strategy will be executed, giving the defined direction 
to the organisation. Tactical roles translate the strategy in executable actions and divide 
the resources over the organisation. The tactical level focuses on middle term (in IT 
around 1 to 3 years). 
3.1 Organisational structures 
The first element, the organisational structure, comes straight from our definition of IT 
governance and is also an element of Gewald‟s governance model. Gewald states that 
“the organizational structure comprises roles, functions and the necessary reporting and 
decision structure in the new organization”. He further notes that responsibilities between 
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organisational levels and partners are part of the organisational structures. Some 
responsibilities lay within the outsourcer‟s or insourcer‟s organisation and some are joint 
(Gewald et al. 2006). 
Responsibilities are indeed part of our governance framework, but unlike Gewald, we 
argue that responsibilities are defined by the combination of organisational structures and 
processes and not within organisational structures only (also see 3.3 Responsibilities). 
The „who‟ from “who should do it” is defined by the roles in an organisation. For proper 
IT governance it is important that certain roles are fulfilled. Therefore we focus on roles 
and the “necessary reporting and decision structure” between them. 
3.2 Joint process fields 
The second element of an IT governance framework, the combination of the joint process 
fields, is also derived from the definition of IT governance and is the „what‟ from “what 
to do” (Gewald et al. 2006). Gewald (2006) sees processes as a part of a governance 
model, whereby he specifically looks at joint processes. Joint processes are the processes 
that the in- and outsourcer share, so where roles from both in- and outsourcer are 
involved. This is also reasonable for this research regarding the focus on the connection 
between the outsourcing and the insourcing company. 
We do not describe all joint processes in detail, as that would not have much sense 
because organisations have different detailed processes. Nevertheless, on a high level it is 
possible to describe fields of processes that are related to each other. 
3.3 Responsibilities 
The third element in the meta model is the linkage between roles and joint process fields. 
These arrows together describe the responsibilities of the organisation as a whole and 
relate to Gewald‟s question “how to do it” (Gewald et al. 2006). 
A common way to define the responsibilities on a high level is to define a RASC-chart, 
or one of it variants. A RASC chart is a matrix with roles on a vertical axe and the joint 
process fields on a horizontal axe. The chart defines per intersection if the role is 
responsible (R), has to approve or accept (A, also called accountable), supports the 
person in the R role (S), or is a consultant for the other roles (C) for the concerning 
process field. It is possible to have a combination of responsibilities for one intersection 
and the combination A/R is not uncommon. There is a certain kind of hierarchy in the 
responsibilities, in the order A, R and S, where C should be consulted but stays outside 
this hierarchy. 
A common alternative is RACI, were the I stands for a role that should be informed. We 
have followed Beulen (2006) in adapting the RASC chart because in our view it is 
common that stakeholders should be informed, and the S is relevant to agree on who 
executes the processes in the end. 
3.4 Control indicators 
By defining control indicators (CIs) it is possible to answer the question “how it should 
be measured” (Gewald et al. 2006). CIs are linked to each other in a hierarchy, and 
together answer the question “are we in control?”. 
It is impossible to prescribe the entire hierarchy of CIs in a governance framework. The 
CIs should be defined in close cooperation with the business, should reflect their needs 
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and therefore should be flexible by nature. Therefore we do not include specific CI‟s in 
the generic governance model. 
4 A Governance Framework for managing IT Outsourcing relationships 
In this section we instantiate the IT governance meta model into a specific IT governance 
framework based on a review of the literature and interviews with experts within and 
outside Shell. This instance of the meta model (the IT governance framework) is specific 
for a body shop relation. 
As described before in Figure 1 - Research approach, there are four building blocks for 
this framework. The meta model defines the elements of the framework. First, a 
theoretical version of the framework was composed based on literature research on IT 
outsourcing relationships. Beulen‟s (2006) research on roles and their hierarchies has 
been used as the basis for the organisational structures. Gewald‟s (2006) research on joint 
processes was used as the basis for the joint process fields. Our research differs from 
Beulen‟s and Gewald‟s researches because we first define a meta model, which we then 
customize to an IT Governance Framework, which then again can be customized in a 
workshop to fit a specific organization‟s views, context and needs. The results of this 
second step are not described in this paper, but as it was the basis for the interviews in the 
third and fourth blocks, it is incorporated in the final framework as described below. 
The second and third blocks were composed by structured interviews, with four external 
outsourcing experts and three experts within Shell. The external experts were selected 
independently from their relation to Shell, they are recognized outsourcing experts. Mr. 
Vriends works at Getronics Consulting, Mr. Beulen is from Accenture and Mr Lachniet 
& Prins work for Logica. Mr. Hussey, Mr. Overbeeke and Mr. Brink work for Shell 
outside BAM and have experience with a major outsourcing programme in infrastructure. 
All experts agreed that their opinions could be quoted and used for the construction of the 
governance framework. The interviews took place between the 30th of September and the 
15th of October 2008 and the following main questions were discussed: 
1. What is your role and what is your experience with governance? 
2. What roles would/did you define? And why? 
3. What joint process fields would/did you define? And why? 
4.1 Organisational structures 
The first of the three parts of the IT governance framework is the organisational structure. 
This paragraph describes the roles that should exist in an outsourcing relationship, 
according to the literature and interviewees. 
Figure 3 shows the organisational structure that should be in place to enable a 
manageable outsourcing relationship. It is generic because it describes roles that are 
known to all organisations in this situation, with descriptions mainly based on literature. 
The following two sub paragraphs describe the roles for respectively the out- and the 
insourcer, including the reporting lines. A third sub paragraph discusses the 
communication lines between all roles. Together these descriptions add up to Figure 3 
below. 
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Figure 3 - Overview of all roles, reporting lines and communication from practice 
 
The figure clearly shows that there are two different parts within the organisational 
structures; the outsourcer and the insourcer. In literature these are also referred to as the 
service recipient and service provider or supplier respectively (Beulen et al. 2006). We do 
not use these terms because often the service recipient is also an internal service provider 
and we are primarily interested in the relation between the two companies. Therefore we 
need to make a distinction based on organisational instead of functional boundaries. 
Another term for the outsourcer that can be found in literature is „the retained 
organisation‟ (Gewald et al. 2006). However, for the sake of clarity we consequently use 
the term outsourcer throughout this entire paper. 
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4.1.1 Outsourcer 
The roles at the outsourcer‟s side and the reporting lines between them are depicted in  
Figure 4. Just as in other figures, the grey areas are out of scope. 
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Tactical
Project 
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Outsourcer (service recipient)
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Information 
manager
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manager
B
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n
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Chief Information 
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Delivery 
supervisor
Portfolio 
manager
IT 
architect
Service 
manager
Finance
manager
 
 
Figure 4 - Roles at the outsourcer 
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The overall role of the outsourcer is to receive and check the service provided by the 
insourcer. The outsourcer‟s department that takes up this role can be, and often is, a 
service provider within the outsourcer‟s organisation. The roles described below are the 
roles within the outsourcer‟s organisation on the interface with the insourcer, regardless 
of the relation to other roles within the outsourcer‟s organisation. 
Information manager 
Beulen (2006) defines this role as follows: “Information managers are responsible for the 
IT services and the implementation of their company‟s IS [(Information Systems)] and IT 
strategies. They serve as contact persons for the company‟s divisions who must define 
their information needs. In large companies there may be several Information managers, 
each with responsibility for part of the company. Information managers report to the 
Chief information officer (CIO)” (Beulen et al. 2006). 
There are no other authors who mention this kind of role, but because it clearly maps to 
some of the joint processes (as we will show in paragraph 4.2) we consider it necessary. 
On the role of Information manager was little discussion in the interviews. On the tactical 
level Information managers have the most accountabilities and responsibilities as they are 
responsible for the IT services and the implementation of their company‟s IS and IT 
strategies (Beulen et al. 2006). 
Service manager and Delivery supervisor 
These roles are derived from what Beulen calls the Service delivery supervisor (Beulen et 
al. 2006). He defines this role as follows: “Service delivery supervisors manage external 
IT providers and, if applicable, the internal IT department. They report to their 
Information manager” (Beulen et al. 2006). From the RASC chart that Beulen sketches it 
becomes clear that the Service delivery supervisor should also manage the contracts and 
makes sure they are aligned with the business‟s requirements. 
Gewald et al. (2006) describe two roles within the retained (i.e. the outsourcer‟s) 
organisation that together form a similar role as the service delivery supervisor; the 
contract manager and the service level manager. The contract manager maps to the 
Service delivery supervisor with respect to the contract responsibilities, as he “ensures 
that the service provider (i.e. the insourcer) delivers according to the contract”. The 
service level manager is more concerned with the content part of the Service delivery 
supervisor‟s responsibilities as he is “responsible for the quality of the services delivered 
in accordance with the SLAs” (Gewald et al. 2006). 
As a result of the interviews with Mr. Brink, Overbeeke and Vriends, we have split this 
role in two: the Service manager and the Delivery supervisor. They are responsible for 
two different axes within the IT organisation; the service for the business and the 
functionality or applications delivered by the insourcer. The service delivered by a 
Service manager is a combination of functionalities delivered by different Delivery 
supervisors, and the functionalities (the applications) that a Delivery supervisor delivers 
is input to several services of several Service managers. This is depicted in Figure 5 and 
implies that the Service manager focuses on the business and the Delivery supervisor on 
the insourcer. 
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Figure 5 - Service managers vs. Delivery managers 
 
How many Service managers and Delivery supervisors an organisation has depends for 
example on the size of the organisation, the amount and complexity required services and 
the size and complexity of the outsourced functionality. Both the Service manager and 
the Delivery supervisor report to the Information manager, where the two lines of 
functionality and services are combined. Apart from that they both give input to the 
Portfolio manager, who has to align the services and functional landscape. 
There is a clear relation between the Service manager and Delivery supervisor and the 
description of the Service delivery supervisor from Beulen (2006). As discussed before, 
Beulen states that “Service delivery supervisors manage external IT providers and, if 
applicable, the internal IT department”, but it also becomes clear that the Service delivery 
supervisor also manages the contracts and makes sure they are aligned with the 
business‟s requirements (Beulen et al. 2006). Here we see actually two roles within the 
description of a Service delivery supervisor; the Delivery supervisor who manages the 
external IT providers and the internal IT department, and the Service manager who 
makes sure that the delivered services are aligned with the business‟s requirements. As 
we described earlier, also Gewald defines a Service level manager, who is “responsible 
for the quality of the services delivered in accordance with the SLAs” (Gewald et al. 
2006). 
Purchaser 
Beulen defines this role as follows: “Purchasers support their Information managers and 
the service provider‟s contract manager in selecting and managing external IT providers 
and, if applicable, managing the internal IT department. They represent both the IS 
function‟s interests and those of the company‟s divisions. They do not report to any 
official within the IS function” (Beulen et al. 2006). 
Having a mainly supportive role, the purchaser is probably not the most critical role. 
Furthermore we found no other authors that identified this role. Nevertheless, the 
purchaser is involved in many of the tactical processes (as will be explained in paragraph 
4.2). 
From the interviews with Mr Brink, Hussey and Overbeeke it can be concluded that 
another name used for the Purchaser is the Contracting & Procurement role. The 
Purchaser is responsible for everything that concerns the contractual part of agreements 
and contracts. 
Business analyst 
Beulen defines this role as follows: “Business analysts implement the IS and IT 
strategies. They serve as contact persons for the company‟s divisions who must define 
their information needs. In large companies there are several business analysts, each with 
responsibility for part of the company. They report to their respective Information 
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managers” (Beulen et al. 2006). As business analysts form the link to the business, this 
role corresponds with what Gewald (2006) calls the Business Unit Manager. 
The Business analyst is the linking pin to the business and helps them to transform their 
wishes into requirements. Interviewees agreed with the theoretical view on Business 
analysts. The Business analyst reports to the Information manager, but he is consulted 
throughout the outsourcer‟s organisation for his expertise and knowledge about the 
business. 
Finance manager 
The Finance and/or Administration manager is mentioned by Gewald as one of the roles 
at the retained organisation. Beulen (2006) does not include this role. According to 
Gewald “financial and administrative functions are necessary to validate the service 
provider invoices ensuring adherence to the contract and the agreed prices as well as 
inter-company invoicing to the business units” (Gewald et al. 2006). 
In the IT governance framework, the Finance/Administration manager is renamed to 
Finance manager because this role did not have specific administration tasks with respect 
to the joint processes that we defined. Interviewees agreed on the importance of this role 
with respect to its financial responsibilities. The Finance manager reports to the CIO. 
IT architect and Innovation manager 
Gewald (2006) identifies an architect or innovation role. According to Gewald the IT 
architect “ensures that the technical ability stays within the retained organization in order 
to maintain and to control architectural design. The architect has to ensure that the IT 
architecture reflects the business requirements” (Gewald et al. 2006). 
However, most authors consider the IT architect as a strategic role, and so do our 
interviewees. But with the positioning of the IT architect on a strategic level, there 
remains a gap on tactical level with respect to Innovation Management, as also described 
in paragraph 4.2 (Vriends 2008). Therefore the Innovation manager role is included and 
is responsible for the exploration and implementation of innovations on both business as 
technology areas, as long as they remain within the strategy as formulated on strategic 
level by amongst others the IT architect and Portfolio manager. The Innovation manager 
reports to the Information manager and has a functional line towards the IT architect and 
Portfolio manager. 
4.1.2 Insourcer 
The roles at the insourcer and their reporting lines are depicted in Figure 6. The grey 
areas are out of scope. The following paragraphs explain the roles defined at the 
insourcer‟s side. 
The insourcer is mainly concerned with providing the agreed services. Nevertheless, as 
their customer‟s needs often change over time, they should be flexible in adapting their 
agreements as well. So their goal may not be to deliver the agreed services, but to deliver 
the needed services. 
In order to do so, the insourcer needs to fill in the following roles (Beulen et al. 2006). 
Unfortunately, we have found no other authors in the field of IT governance and 
outsourcing that define the insourcer‟s roles. 
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Figure 6 - Roles at the insourcer 
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IT director 
Beulen defines this role as follows: “IT directors carry final responsibility for the delivery of 
IT services as well as for the continuity of service delivery by external and, if applicable, 
internal IT providers. They are the IS function‟s strategic-level contact persons. If the IT 
services are outsourced, this role is played by the supplier‟s general manager” (Beulen et al. 
2006). 
Although Beulen defines the IT director as a tactical role, interviewees stated that he belongs 
to the strategic level. Hussey stated that because he is the highest in hierarchy at the insourcer 
he is the counterpart of the CIO. Of course this also depends on the importance of the 
insourcer to the outsourcer; if the insourcer is not very important the IT director will be the 
counterpart of the Information manager and thus on tactical level in the relationship. 
Account manager 
Beulen defines this role as follows: “Account managers maintain relationships with the IS 
function (and the managers of the recipient company‟s divisions). Their contacts partly focus 
on widening the scope and increasing the scale of their contracts. They are held accountable 
for the scale of the services delivered and for customer satisfaction. Account managers serve 
as tactical-level contact persons for the IS function; together with the contract managers they 
are the provider‟s front office” (Beulen et al. 2006). 
The interviewees mostly agreed with this definition of Account manager. Hussey mentioned 
that his work may to a certain extent be strategic as the Account manager is responsible for 
fulfilling all the outsourcer‟s needs. Nevertheless, as his main counterpart is the Information 
manager, he remains on a tactical level, as Beulen also explicitly stated (Beulen et al. 2006). 
He reports to the IT director. 
Contract manager 
Beulen defines this role as follows: “Contract managers are responsible for delivering the IT 
services contracted and for reporting and invoicing. For these aspects contract managers serve 
as contact persons for the IS function; together with the account managers they are the 
provider‟s front office” (Beulen et al. 2006). 
The interviewees agreed on this role of the Contract manager. In his interview Beulen stated 
that he reports to either the Account manager or the IT director. 
Delivery manager 
The Delivery manager is deducted from Beulen‟s Service Delivery Manager. “Service 
delivery managers (SDMs) manage the IT professionals who deliver the IT services. They 
report to the contract managers” (Beulen et al. 2006). 
The Delivery manager is purely responsible for delivering the products as specified in the 
contract and therefore manages one or more IT professionals. Brink, Hussey, Overbeeke and 
Vriends all stressed that in a body shop relation it is unimportant to the insourcer how these 
products map to services, as this is the responsibility of the outsourcer (the Service manager 
and Delivery supervisor). The Delivery manager reports to the Contract manager. 
Process manager 
Beulen defines this role as follows: “Process managers set up and maintain the processes and 
certification of the IT services delivered. This responsibility does not pertain to any specific 
contract but to the IT services delivered for all the supplier‟s contracts. Process managers 
report to their IT director” (Beulen et al. 2006). 
The insourcer‟s Process manager makes sure that IT professionals use the right methodologies 
and processes, such as for example ITIL, the ISO standards or specific tools for testing 
(Hussey 2008). In that way they ensure certification, which does, as Beulen (2006) mentions, 
not pertain to any specific contract but to all the supplier‟s contracts. 
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Competence manager 
Beulen defines this role as follows: “Competence managers investigate the potential of new 
technologies. This responsibility does not pertain to any specific contract but to the IT 
services delivered for all the supplier‟s contracts. The intention is to ascertain delivery 
continuity. Competence managers report to their IT director” (Beulen et al. 2006). 
Hussey and Overbeeke indicated that the Competence manager is responsible for delivering 
the right people with the right skills to the Delivery manager. Furthermore, Vriends agreed 
with the definition that the Competence manager investigates the potential of new 
technologies. These two responsibilities fit together because training the right people with the 
right skills highly depends on the skills in technologies that outsourcers ask for. 
IT professional 
Beulen defines this role as follows: “IT professionals deliver the IT services and investigate 
the potential of new technologies. They report to either the service delivery manager or to the 
competence manager” (Beulen et al. 2006). 
As a result of the interviews, the IT professional is on an operational instead of a tactical level 
as Beulen (2006) indicates. All interviewees stated that the reason is that he is the professional 
who in the end delivers the products as described in the contract. Even though he may have a 
supportive role to the tactical level, his responsibilities remain on an operational level.  
 
 
Figure 7 - Communication between roles 
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4.1.3 Communication 
The communication lines between roles and out- and insourcer are depicted in Figure 7 above. 
This figure focuses only on tactical level and neglects communication already implied by the 
reporting lines. 
 
Most of the internal communication within the outsourcer or the insourcer is already 
described above. What this figure clearly shows is that on a tactical level, there are four 
different levels on which out- and insourcer communicate together. First, there is interaction 
with respect to engagement on the highest level. The Account manager and Information 
manager focus on relational aspects and evaluate issues concerning the engagement.  
Secondly, the Purchaser and Contract manager discuss contractual matters, including the 
negotiation in the setup phase of the relation. When a contract is in place, the relation between 
the Steady state and the Contract manager is stronger than between the Purchaser and the 
Contract manager. The reason is that the Service manager and Delivery supervisor are using 
the contract on an ongoing basis, although the contract owner will still be the Purchaser. 
Therefore the Purchaser gets involved if there are contract issues that require changes to the 
actual contract. 
Nevertheless, for the Service manager and the Delivery supervisor the third interaction is 
most important, which is the relation with the Delivery manager and concerns the daily 
business.  
The fourth important interaction on tactical level concerns new technologies. Both the 
Competence manager and the Innovation manager are responsible for innovation within their 
own organisation so they have to align which technologies are emerging and in which areas it 
is wise to invest. 
4.2 Joint process fields 
The second of the three parts of the IT governance framework are the joint process fields. 
This paragraph describes the joint processes that are desired to exist in an outsourcing 
relationship, based on literature and interviews. 
Figure 8 shows the joint process fields of the IT governance framework, which we based on 
theory and the interviews. The theoretical basis for all processes except Performance 
Management comes from Gewald (2006). 
As displayed in Figure 8 there are two different kinds of processes; horizontal and vertical 
processes. Vertical processes exist on multiple levels, while the horizontal processes only take 
place on tactical level (Gewald et al. 2006). 
The following paragraphs describe each of these process fields, followed by a subparagraph 
that discusses alternative views of the cited authors and why we did not choose to incorporate 
these views. 
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Figure 8 - Joint processes 
4.2.1 Contract Management 
The goal of Contract Management is to facilitate contracts throughout all phases of the 
outsourcing lifecycle and has a slightly administrative character (Beulen 2008). The financial 
maintenance of the contract, such as paying penalties or bonuses, is part of Financial 
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Management (see the respective paragraph). Contract Management includes for example the 
set-up of a contract, but also the maintenance; adjusting the contract when business needs 
have changed. Also evaluation of the contract is part of contract management. 
Other authors than Gewald that prescribe Contract Management as an important governance 
process field are Beulen (2006) and Van Bon (2007). Beulen states that „contract facilitation‟ 
is one of the tactical processes concerning the governance of offshore outsourcing 
relationships and Van Bon states that “the services, service scope and contract reviews in 
comparison with original business requirements” should be monitored closely within the 
process supplier management in order to minimize risks (Beulen et al. 2006; van Bon et al. 
2007). 
Interviewees agreed with the positioning and definition of Contract Management in the 
framework (Brink 2008; Hussey 2008; Vriends 2008). 
4.2.2 Financial Management 
Three interviewees added Financial Management to the framework, being Brink, Lachniet and 
Prins, and Vriends. The goal of Financial Management is to budget for steady state and 
innovations, to fund projects and to allocate costs to the business, and is mainly unrelated to 
the contract. It includes supply and demand forecasting, as budgets are based on those 
forecasts (Vriends 2008). Also reporting to the strategic processes that decide whether to 
invest or disinvest is a part of Financial Management. This joint process area is not specified 
in theory. 
4.2.3 IT-Architecture and Innovation Management 
Gewald (2006) mentions IT-Architecture and Innovation Management as one process field. 
Beulen (2006) states that „architecture planning‟ is a strategic instead of a tactic process and 
„investigating and developing the potential of new technologies‟ is tactical. On the basis of 
our interviews the IT governance framework also states that IT-Architecture Management is a 
strategic process, and Innovation Management is not. In his interview Beulen also stated that 
IT-Architecture Management has as goal to design the architectural platform and is therefore 
mainly technology focused, in contrary to IT Portfolio Management. 
The goal of Innovation Management is to develop the potential of new technologies, methods 
and business models. Innovation Management focuses on two kinds of innovations: 
- Technical innovations; innovation of IT related methods and techniques such as SOA, 
ESB etc.  
- Business innovations; e.g. new business models such as offshoring or e-business. 
Furthermore, Innovation Management has two main tasks: 
- Translating the IT strategies in concrete plans that can be implemented on operational 
level (business pull), 
- Providing innovative developments and opportunities on the market / insourcer to 
Functional Planning and IT-Architecture Management (technology push). 
4.2.4 Escalation Management 
The goal of Escalation Management is well described by Cullen (2005) and is to manage 
issues, variations and disputes. Gewald (2006) considers this process field as a vertical field 
that overlaps all organisational levels. In fact Escalation Management is vertical in its very 
nature, because issues, variations and disputes are escalated up the hierarchical tree. Only the 
most severe issues will reach the strategic level. 
Brink, Hussey, Lachniet and Prins, and Vriends agreed upon the focus and place of Escalation 
Management. Nevertheless, both Overbeeke and Beulen mentioned the relation to Incident 
Management (an operational process). Where Overbeeke saw Escalation Management as a 
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part of Incident Management, Beulen stated that it is closely related, as Incident Management 
is the delivery process and Escalation Management is the relational process.  
We decided to include Escalation Management in two flavours; horizontal escalations and 
vertical escalations. Horizontal escalations are escalations on the same level for e.g. additional 
knowledge or advise from a related team or colleague. Vertical escalations run up the 
hierarchy and may concern disputes, but also for example the need for extra resources. 
Vertical escalations may run parallel to incidents as Beulen suggested in his interview, but 
Escalation Management comprises of more than incidents, such as general performance issues 
or contractual issues. 
4.2.5 Engagement Management 
Engagement and Project Management is one of the three vertical processes of Gewald (2006), 
because it takes place on all levels of the organisation. Other authors mention „vendor 
development‟ (Beulen et al. 2006) and „invest in the relation‟ (Cullen et al. 2005). The term 
„project‟ in Engagement and Project Management means something different from the same 
term in Programme and Project Portfolio Management as mentioned below. Insourcers use the 
term „project‟ to refer to a contract with one of their outsourcers, which is the meaning in this 
context. We find it confusing to have two processes that address two different meanings of 
projects, so we renamed Engagement and Project Management to Engagement Management. 
The goal of this joint process is to manage the relation with the insourcer. 
Three of our interviewees (Beulen, Hussey and Vriends) indicated that Engagement 
Management is not a process but should be a general norm or value, built in roles and 
functions. However Brink argued that Shell‟s Common Process Model explicitly describes a 
similar process; Supplier Relationship Management. Furthermore both Vriends and Beulen 
specified specific KPIs for this process, which implies that certain activities should take place 
to measure them and influence them if they are not satisfactory. Therefore Engagement 
Management is one of the processes of the IT governance framework.  
4.2.6 Performance Management 
Gewald does not mention Performance Management, although he already says in his paper 
that his processes are only examples of joint processes. Almost all other authors do address 
Performance Management as a distinct process field and therefore we have added it (Beulen 
et al. 2006; Cullen et al. 2005; de Looff 1997; van Bon et al. 2007). The goal of Performance 
Management is to evaluate the performed work compared to the agreements in the contract 
and to measure the compliance to the business requirements. Reporting is one of the main 
activities within this process field and Performance Management is a vertical process field. 
All interviewees confirm the importance of Performance Management. Beulen and Lachniet 
and Prins see it as a part of Contract Management, but Brink and Vriends do not agree. Where 
Contract Management focuses on the contracts and is more administrative, Performance 
Management focuses on services and functionality and measures its performance. 
Performance Management also compares this to both the contracts and the business 
requirements, and triggers Contract Management if they are not aligned anymore and the 
contract should be revised. Performance Management has much to do with the day-to-day 
business. 
4.2.7 Risk Management 
The goal of Risk Management is to identify and mitigate risks. A part of Risk Management is 
to plan contingencies (Cullen et al. 2005). Also the IT Governance Institute considers Risk 
Management as one of the five most important process fields (IT Governance Institute 2004). 
Risk Management is a vertical process with responsibilities on every level, as confirmed by 
Beulen, Hussey and Vriends. Risks in for example supply and demand forecasting should be 
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aligned with the supplier to be able to mitigate them. Risk Management is a broad process, 
which includes: 
- Capacity & availability management  
- Information security, or privacy & compliancy  
- Continuity management 
4.2.8 Portfolio Management 
Portfolio Management is derived from what Gewald calls Functional Planning (Gewald et al. 
2006). Because Gewald did not give a definition of this process, we initially defined the goal 
of Functional Planning as: to design a functional roadmap for IT assets. However, Hussey 
and Vriends indicated that they saw Functional Planning as a strategic process. According to 
Vriends, Functional Planning is comparable to the more common term Application Portfolio 
Planning, as a functional roadmap should also be a part of an application landscape. 
Furthermore, also Shell‟s Common Process Model does not specify Functional Planning but 
does specify Portfolio Management & Standards as a process on strategic level. Brink states 
that this process is comparable to what we mean with Functional Planning. In short, 
Functional Planning has several characteristics of processes at a strategic level; it designs the 
functional roadmap, which is setting the direction. Defining the desired functionalities is also 
intertwined with the core and identity of the organisation, which is a strategic characteristic. 
For all these reasons we decided to move Functional Planning to a strategic level and rename 
it to IT Portfolio Management. IT Portfolio Management in this context does not only include 
Application Portfolio Management, but also Service Portfolio Management. The goal is to 
design and align services and functionality. Concretely, this means that this process has as 
output the strategy for the service catalogue („which services do we want to deliver and 
how?‟) and the application landscape („which functionalities/ applications do we want to 
deliver and how?‟). The process is focused on the business and translates business needs into 
the IT strategy. 
4.2.9 Programme and Project Portfolio Management 
Gewald is the only author that mentions Programme and Project Portfolio Management (in 
this context). We define the goal as to manage programmes and projects in order to improve 
business and IT alignment and consider that as a process that adds value to the framework. 
Beulen, Brink, Hussey, Lachniet and Prins as well as Vriends agreed on the importance and 
focus of Programme and Project Portfolio Management. However, as projects are out of scope 
the process is greyed out. 
4.2.10 Other process fields from cited authors 
Of course, the authors cited above also mention other processes than the ones mapped to our 
framework. This subparagraph shortly lists the reasons why these process fields were not 
incorporated in the framework. 
„Maintain internal capacity‟, as proposed by De Looff, is not a joint process. On the contrary, 
both „Measure compliance to requirements‟ and „Enforce compliance‟ are relevant. As we do 
not see fit with one of Gewald‟s processes, both can be linked to a „new‟ relevant process 
field; Performance Management (de Looff 1997). 
Van Bon says that the performance of suppliers should be monitored, which is done by 
Performance Management. Secondly, he states that the services, service scope and contract 
reviews in comparison with original business requirements should be monitored. We consider 
this part of Contract Management as it is related to the insourcer-outsourcer contract and its 
linkage with the business (van Bon et al. 2007). 
Finally, Cullen mentions nine activities that are relevant for existing outsourcing 
relationships. We consider the first, „Invest in the relationship (plan, assess and improve)‟, 
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part of Engagement Management. The second is „Meaningful reporting and analyses‟, which 
we see as a general value that is important for each and every process field. It is therefore not 
included in Figure 8. The same holds for the third and fourth processes; „Regular 
communication and meetings‟ and „Diligent documentation and administration‟. Activity five 
is „Manage risks and plan contingencies‟ and part of Risk Management. We see the sixth 
activity, „Manage issues, variations and disputes‟, as part of the vertical Escalation 
Management process field. For the seventh activity, „Effect continuous improvement and 
streamlining‟, the same holds as for the second to fourth activities; it is a general activity that 
should be implemented throughout all process fields. Finally, the eight and ninth both are part 
of Performance Management as they are „Evaluate and audit supplier (controls, performance, 
compliance)‟ and „Evaluate organization both as a customer and contract manager‟ (Cullen et 
al. 2005). 
4.3 Responsibilities 
The third and final part of the IT governance framework is the responsibilities of the defined 
roles in the defined joint processes. 
When combining the organisational structures with the joint process fields, it is possible to 
describe responsibilities by defining a RASC chart (see subparagraph 3.3). Table 4 shows the 
accountable, responsible, supportive, and consulting roles, which are explained below in  
Table 5. This chart was initially based on a literature study, where some of the responsibilities 
are adopted from Beulen (2006). The result of this initial study was discussed in the 
interviews with experts from inside and outside Shell, which in the end resulted in the RASC 
chart displayed below. 
Table 4 - RASC chart from practice 
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Table 5 - Description of responsibilities 
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Cell Explanation 
1b On a tactical level, the Purchaser is both accountable and responsible for Contract 
Management. Organisation wide, the accountability of the contracts may lay with a 
different role on a strategic level. 
1c, e, f The Finance manager, Service manager and Delivery supervisor support the Purchaser in 
Contract Management. The Finance manager will support the Purchaser in his financial 
negotiations. As described before, the Service manager and Delivery supervisor will trigger 
the Purchaser if contracts should be revisited. They are managing the contract on a daily 
basis, but the ownership of the contract remains with the Purchaser. 
1i, j From an insourcer‟s perspective, the Contract manager is responsible for Contract 
Management. He is supported by the Delivery manager for input from performance 
perspective. 
2c The Finance manager is both accountable and responsible for Financial Management. 
2e, f, j The Service manager, Delivery supervisor and Delivery manager support the Finance 
manager by providing budget proposals and performance information. 
3a, g The Information manager is accountable for Innovation Management, but delegates the 
actual investigation and implementations to the Innovation manager. 
3d, l The Information manager consults the Business analyst to get the business requirements 
and innovation needs (business pull) and the Competence manager for technical 
innovations (technology push). 
3e, f, j The Service manager and Delivery supervisor support the Innovation manager by taking 
innovation into the steady state and advising him how to align innovations with the steady 
state. The Delivery manager will in the end implement the innovations at the insourcer. 
4a, e, f As the highest in the outsourcer‟s hierarchy, the Information manager is on a tactical level 
accountable for Escalation Management. The Service manager and Delivery supervisor are 
responsible because they have other people reporting to them, and are the first point of 
contact in the escalation path for these people. 
4h, i, j Within the insourcer the Account manager is responsible that escalations are also managed 
across boundaries towards the outsourcer, and he delegates that to the roles under his 
reporting line, the Contract manager and Delivery manager. 
5a, h The Information manager is accountable for the engagement with the insourcer, and the 
Account manager is responsible, as it is his core role. 
6a, e, f, 
j 
The Information manager is accountable for good Performance Management towards the 
strategic level. He delegates the responsibilities towards the Service manager and Delivery 
supervisor on the outsourcer‟s side, and to the Delivery manager on the insourcer‟s side. 
They manage the day-to-day Performance Management. 
6b, d, g The Purchaser and Business analyst advise the Service manager and Delivery supervisor in 
Performance Management in the matters of respectively contracts and business 
requirements. The Innovation manager advises them in upcoming innovations that should 
be taken into the steady state. 
6k, l The insourcer‟s Process manager and Competence manager support the Delivery manager 
in respectively working according to the insourcer‟s standards, methods and techniques, 
and making use of the right people with the right skills. 
7a, h The Information manager is accountable and responsible for Risk Management on a tactical 
level. Part of this responsibility also resides with the Account manager, as he has the 
responsibility to comply as much as possible with the needs of the outsourcer. He therefore 
also has to assess risks together with the Information manager 
7b, c, d, 
e, f, g, i, 
j, k, l 
All other roles support the Information manager and Account manager in assessing and 
mitigating the risks on their own fields, like Financial Management, Innovation 
Management and Performance Management. They have to report high risks to the 
Information manager or Account manager. 
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5 Application of the Governance Framework to Shell BAM 
To test the applicability of the IT governance framework in practice, we have again 
customized the framework in a third layer which is specifically designed for Shell Global 
Functions IT BAM, a part of Royal Dutch Shell plc which currently is involved in an 
outsourcing relationship. The third layer for BAM is their specific desired situation. 
This section starts with a high level introduction of Shell (GFIT) BAM, then describes the 
workshop that we did with representatives, and ends with the outcomes of the workshop 
regarding the usability and usefulness of the framework. For reasons of confidentiality, we 
cannot report on the details of the Shell BAM outsourcing governance. We do not view this as 
a very critical constraint as the main objective of the Shell BAM case study is to validate the 
Governance framework rather than to zoom in on the specifics of the outsourcing relationship.  
5.1 IT governance at Shell GFIT BAM 
Global Functions IT Business Application Management (GFIT BAM, or simply BAM) is 
responsible for the applications of the business
1
, including support, transition to support and 
service delivery. A different part of GFIT is responsible for all infrastructure, including the 
infrastructure for the applications, but BAM has the final responsibility to deliver the services 
to the business.  
BAM is using „body shopping‟ or „staff augmentation‟ to hire people at the insourcer, which 
means that the insourcer reserves a specific number of FTE‟s per BAM team, specified per 
technology group of applications. A technology group is a group of applications that are based 
on the same technology (e.g. Visual Basic, .Net, etc.). 
BAM‟s customers for support are the businesses, that provide the complaints and wishes on 
which the relation with the insourcer is based. The end-users are Shell employees within these 
businesses that use the applications. This is depicted in  
Figure 9. 
 
End-users
InsourcerGF IT BAM
Fixed issues, reports, invoices
Specified issues:
- requests
- changes
- problems
- enhancements
Complaints, wishes
Services
Business = Customer
(e.g. Central HR, Central
Finance, Gas & Power, etc)
 
 
Figure 9 – Relations of BAM Support 
 
We conducted a stakeholder and problem analysis within BAM, which showed that BAM 
faces a common problem in outsourcing relations: there is a lack of management control in at 
                                               
1 For the sake of clarity a different part of GFIT, called the „Line of Business‟, is not considered in this description. The LoBs 
are placed in between the BAM and the businesses, but this is not relevant for the remainder of this paper. 
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least one of their offshore body shop outsourcing relations. As described in the introduction, 
this is one of the key risks and problems that the outsourcing industry currently faces. 
5.2 Workshop for Shell BAM 
In order to help BAM to increase the management control in their outsourcing relationships 
we conducted a workshop with representatives of the organisation. The goal of the workshop 
was twofold: (1) to help BAM increase control, but also (2) to test the usability and usefulness 
of the framework in a concrete situation. 
We selected the participants on the basis of their involvement during the research and their 
role in the current organisations. We seeked to invite an audience who would cover most roles 
in our framework. 
From the outsourcer (i.e. Shell) participated the following people: 
- Service Manager HR, whose dominant role was Service manager. 
- Delivery Manager non-SAP EU team, whose dominant role was Delivery supervisor. 
- Business Analyst, whose dominant role was obviously Business analyst 
- On/off boarding team lead and Contract Resourcing, whose dominant role was 
Purchaser. 
From the insourcer participated one person: 
- Engagement manager, whose dominant role was Account manager. 
5.2.1 Workshop methodology 
The workshop took three hours, including a 15-minute coffee break. Before the workshop we 
explained the framework to all participants individually to make them comfortable with it and 
to enable us to start quickly with the contents during the workshop. They received the 
programme one week in advance with a 10-page explanation of the framework and the 
following homework assignment: 
“Identify, prior to the workshop, three „best practices‟ and three issues that you see from your 
current role with respect to the current IT governance in your IT outsourcing relation(s). E.g.: 
- Best practice: There is one person that manages all my contracts and he/she is 
reachable for all my questions and issues. 
- Issue: My counterpart at the insourcer gets his assignments and information from 
several persons throughout our organisation. He sometimes knows more than I 
do and executes work I did not know of, while I am responsible for his actions.” 
The workshop was led by one person and assisted by another. The assistant did not have 
specific knowledge of the framework or research but primarily helped with making photos 
and notes. We did not record or film the workshop, as this could limit the openness of the 
attendees. 
After the workshop we analysed the notes, photos and forms that the participants filled in. We 
split the workshop in two parts, where the part before the break was about the current 
situation (IST) and after the break about the desired situation (SOLL).The programme is 
shown in Table 6. During the first part we started with a few slides to welcome everybody and 
quickly showed the framework. In round 2 the participants each had to put stickers with their 
own colour on the roles and processes they identified themselves with. They also had to put 
an A, R, S or C on the stickers they put in the processes. During round 3 we discussed these 
roles and processes in a plenary session and combined them into a RASC chart. The first part 
took an hour longer than planned, but as the discussion in round 3 was very important to come 
up with a shared RASC chart we catered for this. 
After the break we focused on the input from the homework assignment, and participants 
were divided into pairs. They jointly had to fill in a form where they linked the issues and best 
practices to the framework and designed their desired situation. In round 5 they presented 
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their views. A lively discussion followed about specific outsourcing items. This shows that 
stakeholders were engaged in the practical discussion around the subject and practical 
implications of the framework. The debate was not about the structure or limitations of the 
framework, but about its contents. Finally, we wrapped up and thanked the participants for 
attending the workshop. 
 
Table 6 - Workshop programme 
 
Time 
(mins) 
What How 
15 Welcome & introduction to framework Plenary presentation 
30 Match your role, activities & responsibilities Stickers on poster 
45 Combine responsibilities in one RASC chart (IST) Plenary on flip over 
15 Break  
30 Map good points/ issues to IST and framework 
and come up with Shell solution (SOLL). 
In two smaller groups on basis 
of forms 
25 Present SOLL Two presentations 
20 Wrap up & thanks Plenary 
5.3 Usability and usefulness of the IT governance framework in the workshop 
The detailed outcomes of the workshop that relate to the current and desired practice at BAM 
are confidential. Nevertheless, most important for this paper is the question whether we 
achieved the goals of the workshop: did we help BAM to increase management control, and 
how useable and useful was the framework? 
In general, participants were enthusiastic about the workshop, the use of the framework, as 
well about the outcomes and recommendations for BAM. The workshop showed that the 
framework was particularly useful in two areas: the contents of IT governance and the 
stakeholder management. 
Concerning the contents of IT governance, the use of the framework added value for several 
reasons: 
- The framework worked as a tool that enabled to describe the current and desired situation 
in detail. It made a rather intangible and broad concept IT governance very tangible and 
provided the level of detail to enable a meaningful discussion. Basically it proved to 
structure the discussion and analysis. 
- Using the framework, the current and desired states could be described in detail. The 
framework identified clear gaps between the current and desired situation.  
- Thirdly, besides the meta model also the IT Governance framework is customisable; it 
does not prescribe one truth. In the workshop the IT governance Framework was 
customized into the third layer; the desired situation for BAM specifically. BAM deviated 
mainly on the RASC chart, details are confidential. 
Concerning the stakeholder management, the framework proved also to be very valuable: 
- The framework helped participants understand their added value in the bigger picture, and 
also the value of other roles and hence people in their organisation. This forced them to 
think broader than just their own „kingdom‟ and role, but instead focus on the bigger 
picture. 
- The discussion between people helped them to break through false assumptions. For 
example participants may assume accountability for a process lies with a certain person, 
while in practice this is not true (independent from what it should be). 
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- The proposed situation in the framework can be rather confronting, because it makes 
participants think about their real value and their core responsibilities. As one of the 
attendees commented on the conclusions drawn from the workshop: “this shows a very 
clear understanding of the Shell case, and considerable insight into what is missing and 
what can be done about it” 
6 Conclusions and Discussions 
An outsourcing relationship comes with many risks, concerning areas such as confidentiality, 
business knowledge and management control. Industry and theory have an increasing need to 
manage the relationship with insourcers. This research has addressed the question „what 
practices can be developed to better govern the relationship with offshore vendors?‟, which is 
in the top-3 of key outsourcing research issues. Current literature on IT governance has 
resulted in many definitions and descriptions of IT Governance. Unfortunately, these are 
generally too vague to practically address in an organisation. Based on a literature survey and 
expert interviews this study develops a meta model consisting of (a) organisational structures, 
(b) joint process fields, (c) responsibilities and (d) control indicators, which is then 
customized into an IT governance framework. The first three elements are addressed in this 
paper. The presented IT governance framework gives researchers insight in the best practices 
currently available in the market, as well as an overview of research done on IT governance 
frameworks for offshore outsourcing relationships so far. Another strength of using a 
customized meta model is that it can also be customised for e.g. a Managed Services 
relationship, as we now did for a body shop relation. 
To validate the usefulness and usability of the developed framework, this research also 
applies the Governance framework to the case of Shell GFIT BAM, which gives valuable 
information about the applicability of the Governance Framework in a real world situation. 
The workshop organized indicates that the framework can be very useful as well as useable to 
a company that outsources part of its work and needs to setup, assess or improve governance 
of the relationship. The framework is particularly valuable because it provides a structure for 
the discussions and analysis, a founded proposal to arrange the IT governance, as well as a 
means to involve stakeholders and manage their assumptions, views and (self-)criticism. The 
second customization into the desired situation gives organisations the flexibility to fit the 
situation to their own context and needs, which can for example been done in a workshop. 
On a high level, another lesson learned about the governance of offshore IT outsourcing 
relationships is that it is extremely important for an outsourcer to co-operate. Many of the 
risks in outsourcing are mitigated by one or more of the joint processes defined in the IT 
governance framework. For example, information security and confidentiality is perceived as 
an issue in practice and a risk within literature. The reason is that information crosses 
organisational boundaries and the amount of control by the outsourcer decreases. The joint 
process Risk Management mitigates this risk, because in- and outsourcer are jointly 
responsible for security and confidentiality. A RASC chart makes these responsibilities clear 
and shows that although the outsourcer is accountable, the insourcer is also responsible. This 
„softens‟ the organisational boundaries and enables the outsourcer to have more control when 
information crosses this line. 
Another example is the lack of innovation, one of the main risks described in literature. The 
joint process Innovation Management makes sure that innovation is in place, and that the 
insourcer also has certain responsibilities in this process. In this way outsourcers make sure 
that also the insourcer innovates. 
Nevertheless there is room for improvement and extra research regarding the framework and 
this research. First of all, further research on maturity models and designing a maturity model 
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suited for the IT governance framework may give more insight in the dynamics of the 
framework. A maturity model can offer clear guidance on priorities and phases in the 
implementation trajectory. Furthermore also the relation to capability models like e.g. the 
eSourcing Capability Model from Carnegie Mellon is interesting to investigate. It is 
promising to see how this framework influences the capabilities of the insourcer, which will 
probably also make the value of the framework for the insourcer clearer. Second, it can be 
very valuable to validate the IT governance framework on the basis of more case studies. 
Research questions can address issues such as: “what is the typical RASC chart?” and “which 
variables influence the customization of the governance framework?”. Variables that might 
cause the framework to change are for example: the size of the company, the size of the 
outsourcing contract, previous experience of both parties with outsourcing, the amount of 
trust and formalization in the relationship, the base country of out- and insourcer, … etcetera. 
By investigating more cases, best practices will come to light. Third, further research on 
customising the meta model for a Managed Service relationship instead of the current body 
shop configuration will add value to many companies, including Shell. Many outsourcers 
have started their relationships on the basis of body shopping, but are currently looking into 
outsourcing the complete management of services. The expectation is that in the framework 
certain roles and responsibilities will move towards the insourcer, but probably it is also 
necessary to create new roles and/or processes. Fourth, a thorough investigation on the 
insourcer‟s vision, risks and concerns related to the framework will eliminate some of the 
limitations. The current situation at the insourcer will become clear, as well as the gaps that 
influence the outsourcing relationship. As literature mainly describes outsourcing from an 
outsourcer‟s perspective this may also have a positive theoretical impact. Fifth, the impact on 
the relationship with the business is not taken into account. Still, it is very important to 
involve the business in developing the governance structure. Often, the business does not trust 
the IT governance structure when they do not have a say in it, as also Mr. Brink indicated in 
the interview. Therefore, it will be interesting to investigate the relation between the 
outsourcer‟s IT department(s) and the business who in the end has to pay for the services. 
Finally, through conducting multiple case studies, a library of common and proven Control 
Indicators (CIs) could be defined. This can make it feasible for organisations to select possible 
or widely used CI hierarchies from a library and fill in the measurement area of the 
Governance meta model. 
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